隨著現代股份有限公司股權大量分散之趨勢，為能有效運作公司，近一世紀以來之趨勢即為逐步強化董事會之權能，透過集中而高權之權力機關運作來推進公司運作之效率，但集中賦權之結果亦潛藏經營者違法濫權之危險，特別在對股東會有控制權能之董事，由於公司內部無人可透過內部救濟管道使該董事負責，因此時有身兼董事職位之大股東挾著優勢控制力壓迫小股東之情事發生，倘若股東權制度中對於經營者之義務及責任規範不夠周延，難以互相呼應，則權利受侵害之股東透過法律所賦予之管道欲取得救濟時將受許多不必要之阻礙而使救濟窒礙難行，股東權利之實質保障恐成為空談，因此有必要從較為宏觀之角度檢視整體股東權之規範設計與運作。 本文從股東權之基本理論出發，初步劃定經營者義務及責任本位股東權範圍後，再從英國、美國、日本個別股東權法制發展之脈絡與規範體系觀察其規範所考量之切入點以及所欲達成之規範目的，並從該觀察之研究中，探究於我國有效可行之法規範模式並試行提供粗淺之修法建議。 In order to effectively operate the company under the trend of separation of ownership and control in modern corporate, it has become a tendency to gradually strengthen the power of the board of directors in recent one century. By the means of centralizing and strengthen the power of the authority to promote the operating efficiency, but lead to the risk of abusing power by the operator. Considering that the directors who have enough shares to control the shareholder meeting may have highly possibility using their power and privilege to oppress the minority shareholders, it will be very hard for shareholders to access legal remedy if the legal regulation system of shareholders’ right in regard to the obligations of operator’s duties and responsibilities is not effective and coordinated. Therefore, it’s necessary to examine recent legal regulation of shareholder’s right from the macroscopic view. This essay starts from the basic theory of shareholder’s rights, and initially sets up the scope of the standard of operator’s duties, and then observes the purpose of regulation and legal order from the development and regulatory system in UK, U.S and Japan. At the end, exploring the viable and efficient regulation in Taiwan and providing some suggestions for amendment based on the research of this essay.