本研究探討家族企業相較於非家族企業對於CEO任期和盈餘管理策略間關聯性有不同之影響。不同於過去主流文獻，本研究發現應計項目盈餘管理和實質盈餘管理間具有同時發生的互補關係。實證結果並顯示CEO在任職早期和離職前一年皆會傾向同時運用裁決性應計數和實質盈餘管理來向上修正其報導之淨利，唯在兩種實質盈餘管理方法之運用上有些不同。CEO在任職早期和離職前一年皆會運用異常裁決性費用進行盈餘管理使其淨利向上修正，但僅在離職前一年運用異常生產成本進行盈餘管理。但是將CEO任職之公司區分為家族企業和非家族企業後，本研究發現相較於非家族企業，以家族企業成員擔任之CEO在任職早期，其運用異常裁決性費用使其淨利向上修正之行為較不明顯。而在CEO離職之前一年，家族企業不論是以異常生產成本或是異常裁決性費用向上修正其報導淨利之行為，皆較非家族企業不明顯。本文之實證結果呼應過去家族企業之相關文獻，即當家族企業成員為CEO時，因同時握有公司所有權和經營權，可減少代理問題和盈餘管理行為。 This study examines whether family relative to non-family firms augur differently for the association between CEO tenure and earnings management. I find evidence of simultaneity and complements between discretionary accruals and real activities manipulation. The empirical results document that CEOs in their early years of service are more likely to manage earnings upward via accrual-based earnings management and real activity manipulation, although using two earnings management strategies in different ways. Specifically, CEOs have a higher propensity to use abnormal discretionary expenditures (abnormal production costs) to manage earnings upward in their early and later years of service (final year). In addition, to the extent that the CEO is a family member, he/she would be less likely to manage earnings upward relative to non-family CEO. The results also document that family CEOs have fewer incentives to manage earnings upward via real activities manipulation (i.e., abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary accruals) in their final year of service as compared to their counterpart. Taken together, this study extends prior family literature and documents that family CEOs sharing ownership and control stake may reduce agency conflicts and managerial opportunistic behaviors.