本文探討內部治理(除了CEO以外之高階經理人)對於CEO任期和盈餘管理策略間關聯性的影響。不同於過去之主流文獻,本研究發現裁決性應計數和實質盈餘管理間具有同時發生的互補關係。本文研究結果發現CEO在任職前期與後期均有盈餘管理的情況,亦證實內部治理機制確實存在,對於CEO從事盈餘管理的行為有抑制的效果。 This paper is intended to investigate whether internal governance affects the relative association between CEO tenure and the extent of earnings management. Different from main stream research, I find that accrual-based earnings management and real activities manipulation are simultaneously and complementary. The empirical results indicate that CEO engage in earnings management in early years and final years of their tenure. In addition, we find that internal governance is truly exist, and it will inhibit the earnings management of CEO.