|Abstract: ||自從Anderson, Banker, and Janakiraman(2003)研究發現「成本僵固性」之現象，陸續文獻已指出僵固性與資產強度和未來需求不確定性因素相關，但卻忽略了代理理論上經理人動機與成本僵固性的關聯性。直到Chen, Lu, and Sougiannis(2012)驗證投資者與經理人間存在資訊不對稱的代理問題，引發成本僵固性。本研究以2005年至2012年台灣上市櫃公司的公司資料為樣本驗證Chen, Lu, and Sougiannis(2012)引發銷管費用成本僵固性之成因，並進一步探討良好的公司治理可否降低代理問題所引發之銷管費用成本僵固性。本研究發現，經理人離職年度與經理人任期存在正向關係。本研究也發現，董事會規模越小、董事長不兼任總經理、法人持股比率高及控制權與現金流量權偏離程度越小，皆能有效減緩代理問題所引發之成本僵固性。|
Recent empirical research (Anderson, Banker, and Janakiraman, 2003) indicates that selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) costs behave asymmetrically. This phenomenon is also labeled cost stickiness. Prior studies have predominantly explained cost stickiness with economic factors such as asset intensity and uncertainty of future demand and have largely ignored the impact of managerial incentives on cost behavior. Chen, Lu, and Sougiannis (2012) indicates significant association between the agency problem and cost asymmetry. This study uses a sample of firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange over the 2005-2012 period to examine the stickiness of SG&A costs caused by agency problem, and strong corporate governance mitigate SG&A cost stickiness, as hypothesized by Chen , Lu, and Sougiannis (2012). In this study, we find strong evidence that cost asymmetry is positively associated with the agency problem, as measured by CEO horizon, tenure. Moreover, strong corporate governance, like smaller board size, CEO? Chairman separation, higher institutional holding, and lower the deviation between voting and cash flow rights, mitigate SG&A cost stickiness.