「中央化」的詮釋、實踐與挑戰： 以蔣中正對四川的處置為例（1927-1949）;The Interpretation, Practice, and Challenge of “Centralization”:Take Chiang Kai-shek’s Management of Sichuan Province for Example(1927-1949)

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Title:	「中央化」的詮釋、實踐與挑戰：以蔣中正對四川的處置為例（1927-1949）;The Interpretation, Practice, and Challenge of “Centralization”:Take Chiang Kai-shek’s Management of Sichuan Province for Example(1927-1949)
Authors:	王宏松;WANG, HORNG-SONG
Contributors:	歷史系研究所
Keywords:	劉湘;四川;蔣中正;蔣介石;中央化;地方實力派;Liu Xiang;Chiang Kai-shek;Centralization;Sichuan Province
Date:	2017
Issue Date:	2019-05-23 13:43:44 (UTC+8)
Publisher:	歷史系研究所
Abstract:	國府定都南京後，統治基礎並不穩固，常面臨地方實力派對中央的挑戰。這對國府領導人蔣中正而言，如何有效的進行「中央化」，加強中央集權，深化對地方的控制，這是其念茲在茲的嚴肅課題。從北伐結束到中原大戰期間，蔣對中央化的作為主要是以武力統一的方式來進行。在中原大戰之後，蔣體認到民心厭亂，對於中央化的進程已有不一樣的思考，蔣認為目前的重點應先促進政治的改革，藉由召開國民大會和制訂約法的形式，開啟民主政治的端倪，促進和平統一。　　蔣中正在推動四川「中央化」的相關作為，是有一轉變的過程。初期蔣對四川的態度是以「羈縻」為主，其維持四川的具體作為是二劉（劉湘、劉文輝）名義上分掌軍政大權。但二劉都不滿足於現狀，企圖獨佔四川，二人終究不免一戰。戰事初起，蔣對二劉採「積極勸和」的態度。不過在中央無力制止的情況之下，蔣只能對川戰保持「冷靜待變」。最後二劉之戰由劉湘取得勝利，劉文輝退往西康。四川暫時結束了各軍爭戰的局面，四川正式進入了劉湘主導的時代。　　劉湘雖主導川局，但其因剿共大敗，不得不同意國府派遣參謀團入川協助剿共。蔣中正更於1935年親自入川督察剿共並視察川政，在川停留期間，蔣的作為計有協調各軍剿共、規劃公路建設、要求各軍裁兵、整理四川財政、興辦峨嵋訓練團、建設四川為抗戰根據地等重要措施，為四川中央化奠下良好的基礎。但中央勢力入川後，和劉湘產生了許多的磨擦。兩廣事變、西安事變的發生，可見劉湘對抗中央的行動愈發明顯。蔣在幾經思考後決定以「政治」手段解決川局，由何應欽主持四川整軍工作。不過在會議召開期間，七七事變突然發生，何應欽匆匆結束會議返回南京，四川整軍工作並未落實。　　抗戰爆發，四川軍人積極支援中央抗日。1938年1月，劉湘病逝漢口。蔣為了徹底解決四川地方勢力，決意起用張?繼任四川省政府主席，但張?的人事命令發表後，卻招致四川軍人的反彈。蔣只能改弦易轍，調鄧錫侯出任川康綏靖主任，王纘緒出任省主席。1939年四川又爆發7師長反王（纘緒）風潮，蔣在協調不成的情況下，決定親兼四川省主席。之後在蔣的佈置規畫之下，四川各派軍人終能接受張?接任省主席，這代表著四川的中央化更進一步。　　蔣在抗戰後期處置四川軍政以「懷柔」為方針，希望地方軍人感念中央的善意，心向中央。實際上川軍仍然派系分明，鄧錫侯、潘文華、劉文輝三人各據山頭，與國府保持時而合作、時而對抗的關係。國府在川八年的消極作為，已使四川的「中央化」陷入困局。抗戰結束之後，國府進行整軍工作並成立重慶行營，以張?為行營主任，其工作統籌西南軍政為主，其次才是規劃西南的建設，但因國共內戰愈演愈烈，對四川的建設是心有餘而力不足。　　1949年初，國共戰局逆轉，蔣中正不得不宣布下野，下野前蔣任命張?為重慶綏靖公署主任。張?剛上任，四川就傳出其與楊森、王陵基不和的傳言，加上劉文輝、鄧錫侯、潘文華正在串連反對省主席王陵基，四川局勢顯得詭譎多變。4月，共軍大舉渡江，國府成立西南軍政長官公署，以張?為軍政長官，統籌西南的防務。之後蔣中正此時忙著處理與李宗仁的政爭和台灣軍政的各項準備，對於四川的政治亂象無暇顧及，只能坐視情況的惡化。在共軍即將進攻西南之時，蔣中正在1949年下半年兩度入川，其首要工作是調解川局內部糾紛，但蔣的柔性勸導收不到什麼效果，共軍只花了一個多月就「解放」四川。國府對四川實力派的內鬥束手無策，最後只能眼睜睜看著軍事的失敗，這代表四川「中央化」政策有許多值得檢討的地方。　　蔣中正在四川所進行的「中共化」是把重點放在軍隊的整頓上。中央對川軍的三次整編是交由各地方將領自行負責，中央僅作事後的查證，如此整軍的效果令人懷疑。蔣對川軍將領採取較為放任的態度，讓其有機會保存實力，這導致了部份四川軍人在國共內戰中倒向中共。對國府而言，川軍「中央化」最為成功的是王陵基、孫震與唐式遵等將領，他們的共通點為對日抗戰時奉派出川作戰，受到民族主義、國家觀念的直接洗禮，因此在國共內戰後多能效忠國府。由此可知，國家要能成功的推動軍事「中央化」，需將地方軍隊調離本省，使其脫離與舊有勢力的連結，如此中央化政策才能收事半功倍之效。　　After the Nation Government established a capital in Nanjing, its ruling was not stable and often faced the challenges from local warlords. Chiang Kai-shek, the leader of the Nationalist government, was deeply concerned about the serious issues of how to effectively practice and strengthen the “centralization” and to enhance the control of the local governments. Between the end of the Northern Expedition and the Central Plains War, Chiang tried to centralize mainly by military force. After the Central Plains War, Chiang, who had realized that people were tired of turmoil, had a different idea about the process of centralization. He thought that the priority was to promote the political reform, to start democracy, and to promote the peaceful unification through the holding of the National Assembly and the formulating of the Provisional Constitution.　　Chiang’s practice of “centralization” in Sichuan Province went through some adjustments. At first, Chiang treated Sichuan Province with the idea of the Jimi system. The concrete practice was to nominally allow Liu Xiang and Liu Wen-hui to control the military power separately. But neither of them were satisfied with the situation at that time. Both of them tried to dominate Sichuan Province alone, and the war between them was inevitable. At the beginning of the war, Chiang aggressively tried to negotiate peace between the two Liu’s. But the central government was not powerful enough to stop the war, and Chiang could just wait for the outcome. Finally, Liu Xiang won the victory, and Liu Wen-hui went back to Sikang. The war in Sichuan temporarily came to an end. Sichuan was officially dominated by Liu-Xiang.　　Although Liu Xiang dominated the situation in Sichuan, he suffered from major failure in the communist suppression. He couldn’t help but agree the Nationalist government to send a military staff committee to Sichuan to help the communist suppression. In 1935, Chiang even went to Sichuan in person to inspect the communist suppression and the administration of the Sichuan government. During Chiang’s stay in Sichuan, he coordinated the armies to suppress the communists, planned the road construction, asked the armies to downsize, whipped the finance into shape, held E-Mei Officers Training Regiment, and constructed Sichuan as the base for the war against Japan. These important measures set up good foundations for the centralization of Sichuan. But after the central power reached Sichuan, there was much friction between the central government and Liu Xiang. The Guangdong-Guangxi Incident and the Xian Incident made it clear that Liu Xiang was trying to fight against the central government. After considering thoroughly, Chiang decided to resolve the problem in Sichuan with political measures and asked Ho Ying-chin to consolidate the armies in Sichuan. During the meeting, the Lugou Bridge Incident happened suddenly, and Ho Ying-Chin ended the meeting in a rush and went back to Nanjing. The reorganization of the armies in Sichuan was not put into effect.　　After the war against Japan erupted, the armies in Sichuan aggressively supported the central government to fight against Japan. In January, 1938, Liu Xiang died of disease in Hankou. To thoroughly eradicate the local power in Sichuan, Chiang was determined to appoint Chang Chun to succeed the provincial chairman of Sichuan. However, the appointment led to the objection from the Sichuan armies. Chiang couldn’t help but change his decision. He appointed Deng Xi-hou as the pacification commissioner at Sichuan and Sikan and Wang Zuan-xu as the provincial chairman. In 1939, 7 divisional commanders stood out against Wang Zuan-xu in Sichuan. Chiang failed to coordinate and decided to be the provincial chairman of Sichuan himself. Afterwards, because of Chiang’s plan and arrangement, the armies in Sichuan finally accepted Chang Chun as the provincial chairman. This represented the advance of the centralization in Sichuan.　　Toward the end of the war against Japan, Chiang implemented kid-gloves policy for Sichuan armies in the hope that the local armies would understood that the central government was trying to be kind to them and then be loyal to the central government. In fact, the split was still evident in the line-up for Sichuan armies. Deng Xi-hou, Pan Wen-hua, and Liu Wen-hua had their own territory. Sometimes they cooperated with the Nationalist government, and at other times they fight against it. The Nationalist government’s passive act in Sichuan during the eight years put the “centralization” of Sichuan in a tight pot. After the war against Japan ended, the Nationalist government reorganized the armies and set up the Field Headquarters in Chongqing. Chang Chun was appointed the commissioner, whose job was to coordinate the armies in Southwest China firstly and to plan the construction secondly. But The Chinese Civil War was getting more and more intensely. The construction in Sichuan was out of the government’s depth.　　In the beginning of the year 1949, the situation of the Chinese Civil War was reversed, and Chiang was forced to resign. Before Chiang resigned, he appointed Chang Chun as the pacification commissioner at Chongqing. Shortly after Chang Chun was inaugurated, Rumor had it in Sichuan that he couldn’t get along with Yang Sen and Wang Ling-chi. Moreover, Liu Wen-hui, Deng Xi-hou, and Pan Wen-hua were linking up against provincial chairman Wang Ling-Chi. The situation in Sichuan seemed volatile. In April, massive communist troops crossed the Yanzi River, and the Nationalist government set up the Southeast Military and Political Executive Office, which coordinated the defensive affairs in southwest China, and Chang Chun was appointed the executive officer. Afterwards, Chiang Kai-shek was busy dealing with the political struggle with Li Tsung-jen and preparing for Taiwan’s military affairs. Chiang was not able to stop the political chaos and could just sit by. Shortly before the Communist army attacked Southwest China, Chiang went to Sichuan twice in the second half of the year 1949 with the priority of settling the disputes there. But Chiang’s flexible persuasion was in vain. The communist army “liberated” Sichuan in less than 2 months. The Nationalist government was at its wit’s end with the political infighting among the establishment figures in Sichuan and helplessly waited for the failure of the military action. This meant that the “centralization” policy in Sichuan needed revising.　　The “centralization” promoted by Chiang in Sichuan focused on consolidating the armies. The three-time consolidations were conducted by local military generals. The central government did nothing more than inspecting afterwards. The effect of it was dubious. Chiang gave more freedom to the generals in Sichuan, so they had the chance to keep their power. Therefore, some of the armies chose to stand on the communists’ side during the Chinese Civil War. To the Nationalist government, the most “centralized” armies in Sichuan were the generals Wang Ling-chi, Sun Zhen, Tang Shizun, etc. All of them were assigned to fight in Sichuan during the war against Japan, and they were all convinced of nationalism. Therefore, they could be loyal to the Nationalist government in the Chinese Civil War. Judging from this, to achieve military “centralization” successfully in the nation, the local troops had to be moved to other provinces and their ties with the original local power should be cut. Only by doing so would the “centralization” policy work effectively.
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