本研究探討美國上市公司的高階主管社交活動是否會影響財報品質,並以高爾夫球作為實證研究,以2015年之S&P1500為樣本進行分析。本研究之實證結果顯示公司CEO及CFO都參與高爾夫球活動的話,透過社交活動的互動會比較頻繁,因此可能會互相監督與牽制對方有關財務會計的管理,比較不會利用裁決性應計項目盈餘管理,對公司財報品質較有利;但若公司CEO與CFO僅其中一人參與高爾夫球活動的話,對於裁決性應計項目比較沒有重大影響。另外,若公司CFO高爾夫球的球技水平越高的話,比較會有過度自信的人格特質,因此可能會積極操作應計項目來反應公司內部資訊,而採用裁決性應計項目盈餘管理,對公司財報品質較不利。 This study examines whether the social activities of top executives affect the quality of financial reporting, based on the golfing activity data of top executives of S&P 1500 firms in 2015.The empirical results show that the interaction term of CEO membership and CFO membership has negative impact on firms’ discretionary accrual (DA), while the CEO membership and CFO membership dummies do not have any significant main impact on DA. This finding suggests that the golfing interaction between CEO and CFO can help mitigate earnings manipulation problem. Moreover, firms tend to have large DA when their CFOs are better golfer with better skills. This result is consistent with the argument that an overconfident CFO will tend to exercise larger influence over earnings management. In this situation, the earnings manipulation problem should be concerned.