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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://ccur.lib.ccu.edu.tw/handle/A095B0000Q/670


    Title: 虧損公司董監自肥與成本僵固性;Self-Interested Board of Directors and Cost Stickiness in Loss Companies
    Authors: 陳庭萱;CHEN, TING-SYUAN
    Contributors: 會計與資訊科技研究所
    Keywords: 董監事薪酬;虧損公司董監自肥;肥貓公司;成本僵固性;Compensation of Director and Supervisor;Self-interested Board of Directors;Fat Cat;Cost Stickiness
    Date: 2016
    Issue Date: 2019-07-17
    Publisher: 會計與資訊科技研究所
    Abstract: 隨著全球財務弊案接踵而來,金融危機的爆發使得高階管理者薪資結構議題再度受到重視,透過這些弊案發現許多公司存在嚴重的肥貓現象,本研究採用公開資訊觀測站「公司治理專區」項內,公布之「公司年度稅後虧損為董監事酬金總金額或平均每位董監事酬金卻增加」的上市(櫃)虧損公司作為研究對象,探討董監自肥虧損公司與成本僵固性之關聯程度,並分別以總成本、銷貨成本及銷管費用對研究標的之影響。本研究實證結果發現,董監自肥虧損公司每增加1%的銷貨收入,銷管費用會增加0.413%,而當銷貨收入減少1%時,銷管費用則會減少0.223%,顯示被公告為董監自肥虧損公司的成本僵固性程度較其他非董監自肥虧損公司高。另外,本研究發現不論董監自肥虧損公司在公告年度以後有沒有被除名,對成本僵固性皆沒有影響,而稅後盈餘轉正不再被公告的公司,其成本僵固性程度則較小。
    With the global financial scandals broke out one after another, the explosion of financial crisis caused the issue of executive salary structure being reconsidered. Through those scandals, we could discovered that many companies existed the severe phenomenon of fat cat. The target of this paper is the relationship between loss companies with self-interested board of directors and cost stickiness is examined and tested the impact of total cost, cost of goods sold and SG&A costs individually.In the framework of loss companies with self-interested board of directors, the study shows the SG&A costs increase on average at a rate of 0.413% per 1% increase in sales but decrease only 0.223% per 1% decrease in sales. As indicated, the result of this research presents a fact that the loss companies with self-interested board of directors have more Sticky SG&A costs behavior. Moreover, the empirical results show that the loss companies with self-interested board of directors have no effect of sticky costs behavior whether the company name posted on the MOPS again. Whereas the loss companies with self-interested board of directors, whose net income turns to positive in next year; these companies have less cost stickiness than the other loss companies.
    Appears in Collections:[會計與資訊科技研究所] 學位論文

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